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ABSTRACT 
Kenya got independence in 1963 aciidst a cloud of confu-
sion about the ideological and development path she would follow. 
Such confusion led to an intensive political debate which tended 
to categorize the contestants into leftists and pro-western rightist 
In Muranga District Kaggiah and Kiano represented the two caaps 
respectively, though the latter was more interested in boosting 
his personal political hegemonisn than in ideological victory. 
Since independence, therefore, elections in the District tended 
to revolve around Kiano's political personality. His ouster in 
1979 seems to have led to a new type of political development where 
the very wealthy commercial group of people has taken over politi-
cal leadership in the District, thus finally replacing the entire 
1960's political leadership in the area. 
Political negligence and arrogance, as well as inadequate 
attention to the people's socio-economic needs and demands have 
been identified as the main factors behind the ouster of several. • 
MPs in Muranga and in Kangema particularly. The dominance of elite 
interests in an election has great influence on both the attitude 
and behaviour of the electorate towards the incumbent and his 
challengers, the party and the government, and the efficacy of 
elections in influencing governmental policy. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the discussion 
we started in an earlier paper regarding politics, elections 
and democratic performance in Kenya. In that paper, which dealt 
with Nakuru District and which addressed to the role «f the politics 
of land, ethnicity and sectionalism in electoral competition in the 
district, a theoretical discussion of the notion of elections and 
democracy was attempted by way of introduction and we expert the 
same to form the basis of the present paper. Equally applicable 
is the statement on methodological difficulties which were encountered 
in our research and which we hope the future researchers on elections 
will be able to avoid or overcome. If we let the introductory section 
of the paper on Nakuru apply to the present paper as well, we 
should then move straight to the subject matter of politics and 
elections in Murang'a District. As was the case in the Nakuru paper, 
a microcase study of Kangema is undertaken mainly on the basis of-.a 
survey research conducted during 1983 general elections. Otherwise 
the first part of the paper is largely based on historical, usually 
secondary data. 
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PART I 
IDEOLOGY AND PERSONALITY RIVALRY 
Murang'a District and anti-colonial struggle 
» 
The colonial-political history briefly reviewed in our 
earlier paper on Nakuru had grave repurcusions in Murang'a District. 
As it is well-known, Murang'a was one of the districts of Central ; 
Kenya that had parts of their land alienated by the colonial govern-
ment and allocated for settlement by European settlers. The un-> 
alienated portion of the District was reserved as part of the wide 
African "reserves" which were retained as a pool of labour for the 
settlers. 
The history of the role of the Africans in Murang'a Dis-
trict in the political and armed struggle against colonial rule has 
been recorded in several volumes and needs not be repeated heref^ 
Suffice it to observe here that for several years the district was 
in the.forefront of anti-colonial political struggle right from the 
time of the formation of Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) and later 
on at the time of Kenya African Union (KAU). The district also became 
the main sufferer of the blurt of colonial military force during the 
Mau Mau armed anti-colonial struggle in the seven years of the State 
of Emergency. This was largely an ideological war that sought to 
re-assert the African dominant political position in Kenya as a 
prerequisite for his'economic and social development in freedom. 
Kaggia's Ideological Position 
Small wonder then that Murang1 a became one of the hot beds 
of the sharp ideological controversy which characterized the first 
six years of Kenya's independence. The district also became an 
important participant in the post - 1969 intra-Kikuyu sectional 
strife as depicted earlier in the case of Nakuru District. 
(1) For example, see Bildad Kaggia, Roots of Freedom 1921 - 1963, 
an autobiography, (Nairobi: EAPH' 1975). 
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The ideological controversy of the 1960's was geared 
to finding the road the independent country would follow in its 
social and economic development. It therefore involved mainly the 
leftists and the pro-western rightists who were headed by Tom Mboya. 
This was the controversy that led to the production of sessional 
Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to 
Planning in Kenya. The paper was a Government paper which removed doubts 
as to the commitment of Kanu leadership in leading the new nation on 
a capitalist, and hence pro-western, path. Not only did it reiterate 
the provisions of the independence constitution in respect of property 
rights, but it also accorded private foreign investments a very great 
role in economic growth of the country. Together with the issue of 
unlimited land grabbing by the wealthy Africans, this provision of 
private foreign investments, among other things, became a source of 
great conflict. 
The main leftist-pro-Western conflict in Murang'a was 
championed by B.M. Kaggiah and Dr. J.G. Kiano respectively. The 
former was the MP for Kandara and an assistant minister for Education 
in 1963 - 1964. In June 1964 he resigned from his post as an 
assistant minister when he disagreed with Kenyatta's government policy 
requiring that former European farms be allocated to Africans on basis 
of purchase. Kaggiah's stand was that land belonged to the African 
people, it had been stolen from them and they ought not be made to 
(2) 
purchase it from the Europeans . He also urged the government to put 
a ceiling on the amount of land an individual African could own in the 
former European areas with a view to prevent the emergence of African (3 ) capitalists in the shoes of the outgoing European settlers . 
Kiano, on the other hand, supported the Government fully on 
the issue of land. He had earlier on in 1958 supported land consolida-
tion programme in Central Province and even regarded it as ensential 
(4) for full development of the area. 
(2) Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent..,_Kenya:-;iNairobi;ITAPHrl97<J, 
Reprinted 1974) pp. 4 t- 46. 
(3) Ibid., p. 48 
(4) E. A. Standard, 20/8/58. 
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After independence he seemed to have identified Kaggia as the main 
<_nallenger of his dominant political leadership in the district. 
He therefore levelled several attacks on Kaggia, In 1965 for example, 
Kiano called on Kaggiah to resign as the Murang'a District Kanu 
(5 ) Chairman if he disagreed with Kenyatta on the land issue. 
Kiano's hegemonic bids in District leadership. 
Initially Kiano was the MP for Kangema (1963-66) but 
after the disoluticn of the senate in 1966 he became the member for 
Mbiri, which was formerly Kiharu Constituency with Jessee Mwangi 
Gachago as the MP. From Kangema Kiano took with him Kanyenyaini 
Location (his home area) while from his new constituency of'Mbiri 
was removed Gaturi Location which became part of the newly created 
Makuyu Constituency. For a good politician such as Kiano, a form of 
some home base provided some sense of reasurance in the moments of 
political upheavals, Kiano's heart however, was not in Kangema, but in 
Mbiri, a centrally located constituency that included the main Town 
and the District Headquarters, and one that was expected to play a 
central role in the politics of the district. Indeed, Kiano seems to 
have had this calculation in mind as in the mid-1960's he earnestly 
sought to be recognized as the political leader of Murang'a people 
especially in the ruling party Kanu. ^ ^ 
One is therefore persuaded to conclude that while 
Kaggiah may have been an ideologically committed politician, Kiano 
was simply interested in his personal political dominance in the district 
as a basis of his recognition as one of the power brokers nationally. 
During this period the only competitor for both district and national 
power was Kaggiah whom Kiano decided to fight on the ideological front. 
When the KPU was banned in 1969 and Kaggiah withdrew from active 
political combat, Kiano turned'his weapons against any would-be 
challenger in the district leadership. This time Kiano-'s target 
became 'Jessee Mwangi Gachago, the "unruly" MP for Makuyu who out-
rightly refused being bossed about by Kiano. The ensuing struggle 
was purely on personality, basis thus, once again emphasizing the 
(5) Taifa Leo, 19/4/65 
(6) Also see Gertzel, op. Cit !p. 61 
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the absence of ideological commitment on the part of Kiano on the 
one hand, and his uncompromising thirst for district power on the 
other. 
The formation of Gema and its drive to dominate the 
political scene in Central Province had a distabilizing effect in 
Murang'a District where, as in other districts, the association's 
leadership also sought to head the district political arena as well. 
A similar case has been seen in Nakuru District. In Murang'a efforts 
were made to challenge Kiano in his Mbiri constituency in the 1974 
elections. The attempt was not successful, largely because the Gema-
backed candidate was very weak and thus gave Kiano a chance of win-
ning comfortably. Kiano immediately sensed trouble and immediately 
sought to institute counter sa£tack§, mounting defences and alliances 
where possible. In the 1974 election campaign he posed as the 
vanguard of the northerners' course against the southerners' political 
manoeuvre aimed at edging the northerners out of national political 
leadership. He was behind the organization of several harambee fund 
raising meetings which he used as venues for political counter attacks 
and defences against the new Gema-backed threats. After the elections, 
he reached for the only uncommitted and newly elected MP in the person 
of J.J. Kamotho for Kangema and quickly managed to win him over as an 
ally in the district leadership wrangle. 
Kiano's Decline and Eventual Fall 
All these efforts, determined as they were, did not 
bear a lot of positive fruits. If anything they set the Gema-backed 
leadership perfecting their organization in a martner that clearly demons-
trated that they did not take Kiano for granted any one time. In 
the 1974 elections, therefore, three of the five constituencies in 
the district went to Gema candidates who included George N. Mwichigi 
in Kandara, Mwangi Njuguna in Kigumo, and Jessee Mwangi Gachago in 
Makuyu. All the three were unreservedly opposed to Kiano's claim as 
the leader for Murang'a people, and their commitment to end what they 
saw as Kiano's hegemony was no longer a secret. In 1976, the first 
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serious round of their offensive took place and the Gema leadership 
won most of the sub-branch Kanu seats and all the District positions 
of Kanu executive. From Mbiri, Keneth N. Matiba became the District 
Kanu Secretary while in Kangema John N. Michuki became the Chairman 
of the sub-branch. 
Kiano was therefore ousted as the District Kanu chairman 
in what was perhaps one of the most painful experiences in his entire 
political career. With him went most of his followers. 
The 1976 Kanu elections in Murang' a yjer.e a .prelude of the 
catastrophy on the way. Kiano had taken Mbiri electorate too much 
for granted and his decline politically in this area becane more pre-
cipitins than ever before. It was not surprising therefore that in 
197 9 he lost the seat to Matiba, the one person who had both the 
resources and the stamina to sustain a tough combat against Kiano. 
He finally polled 20,135 votes against Kiano's 16,628 votes, and 
so ousted the last of the leading politicians of the early days of 
independence in the district. Kiano's fall marked an end of an era 
in Murang'a politics. 
It is clear that having been in politics since the colo-
nial period in 1958, Kiano had developed a kind of political arrogance 
and complacency. He took his record for granted and was always ready 
to dismiss his rivals without recrimination. When the latter launched 
their ouslaught in 1979, Kiano could not clearly respond to the Change 
of withdraw from the constituency for most of his political career. 
They condemned him for the comparatively small number of projects 
constructed in the area during his life as its MP. Even more important, 
they forced the electoral debate to concentrate on Kiano's discrimination 
against some of the locations in the constituency; his failure to deal 
with unemployment and poverty in the area was highlighted;, his entire 
performance as the MP for Mbiri was called to question. 
Kiano had therefore paid too much attention to his interests 
in Murang'a leadership at the expense of growth in Mbiri. He was 
worried by the fast growing weight of Mwichigi in Kandara, a growth 
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that he failed" to keep in check given that Mwichigi had a well entrentched 
support in Gema and in the foreign financial springs for the mammoth 
Kandara Water Project of which he was the chief organizer. In Kigumo 
Dr. J.F.C. Munene, his former ally, had lost the seat to Mwangi Njuguna 
in 1974- and was now too preoccupied with his businesses to be able to 
recapture the seat. 
In Kangema, his friend Kamotho successfully braved the storm 
but it was also only a matter of time he too would be gone. In Makuyu 
his ally, P.S. Wachira, regained the seat after Gachago was imprisoned in 
1976 for stealing coffee. He retained it in 1979 by carefully keeping 
out of controversy, All suggesting the difficulties Kiano may have to 
overcome should he wish to make a political come back in the district. 
Perhaps the most important election controversy in 1979 took 
place in Kangema. It was here that J.N. Michuki, a close business 
associate and friend of Matiba and the Vice President Mwai Kibaki, 
the two hailing from the bordering constituencies, Mbiri and Othaya 
respectively, seriously threatened to oust Kamotho as the MP for the 
area. As we see later, this was a hotly - debated election in which 
the entire constituency and the surrounding areas took a lot of interest. 
The main issue at debate was whether Michuki should be popularly elected 
to represent the constituency in independent Kenya's parliament while 
in the colonial days he had supported the colonial regime and had harassed 
and mutilated the Kangema people who were involved in the Mau Mau armed 
struggle for independence. In this debate Kiano was very much in the 
background in support of Kamotho while Michuki was alleged to draw his 
main support, inspirit ion and advice from Matiba and Mwai Kibaki. 
Right from the beginning of 1979, when it was clear that elections 
would be held that year, the debate was so intense that some of the 
wouldbe candidates including Issaiah Ngotho Kariuki shied away in fear 
of the expected storm. The latter, was even carried away rather 
injudiciously provided an outright support for Kamotho, thus sacrificing 
his own credibility in the eyes of the electorate. The result was 
ultimately in favour of Kamotho who polled 17,795 votes against Michuki's 
13,321 votes. 
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He became the only highly educated friend of Kiano to win a seat in 
Murang'a, and in the absence of Kiano himself among the winners, he 
was given the only full ministerial position', to go to Murang'a 
District and was made the Minister for Higher Education. 
The New District Political Cadre 
The fall of Kiano in Mbiri in 1979 seems to have set the 
pace for the clean up that was to come in the 1983 elections. After 
1979, Mwichigi's victory was successfully challenged in the High Court 
by Josephat Mburu Wanyoike, himself a defeated candidate in the 
general elections in Kandara constituency. He was also found guilty 
of an election offence and was therefore disqualified from seeking 
re-election for a period of five years. This meant that short of 
presidential clemency, nothing else would enable Mwichigi to run for 
elections in 19$3. This situation somehow gave some relief to Kiano 
and his supporters in the District all of whom had tried to win David 
Waweru Ngethe, the person who won the by-election after Mwichigi's 
1979 election was nullified, to their side of District leadership 
strive. However, • against what everybody else expected, Mwichigi 
was given presidential pardon and was cleared to run the 1983 elec-
tions in Kandara where he scored a resounding victory over his three 
opponents who polled a total of 20,002 votes against Mwichigi's own 
20,413 votes. An arch-rival of Kiano's power in Murang'a was therefore 
back in parliament. However, his ability to win the leadership of 
Murang'a District even for a short while is doubtful. 
In Kigumo Mwangi Njuguna, a friend and an ally of 
Mwichigi, lost the seat to Francis Mwangi Thuo in what was a crushing 
defeat having polled only 3,401 votes against Thuo's. 13,885 votes. 
The second best performance was that of Professor Gabric Gicia Samson 
Munoru who polled 12,020 votes and nearly captured the seat after 
having, missed it narrowly again in 1979. Thuo is a former Chairman 
of Nairobi Stock Exchange. He is very wealthy, but has managed to 
keep out of Murang'a District wrangle. As such he' seems to have 
been regarded as a man of the constituency and was believed to be 
capable of leading people to greater development through intensified 
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construction Of several social and economic facilities especially in 
the upper areas near the forest region where he hails from. 
In Mbiri Matiba retained his seat after fighting a battle 
which he initially tended to ignore, but later on found to be dangerous 
in terms of the rate at which he was losing votes. He polled 21,134 
votes against Jidruph Mwangi Kamau Mweru of Mugoiri Location, who polled 
13,054 and thus served as a reminder to Matiba that arrogance could 
sometimes be very costly politically. The one political statement that 
Matiba used in his campaign was that "Mbiri was for the rich, not for 
the poor". In a constituency where poverty is on the increase, the 
statement turned out to be irritating to a large section of the voters 
who felt betrayed and dejected. No wonder that Kamau Mweru polled 
so many votes, a performance hardly expected by most observers during 
the first half of the campaign period. The class debate intensified 
in the second half of the campaign period and thus became the most 
important factor behind the 62.3%.. voter turn out that year. 
What is significant, however, is that, while the three 
new comers in the district might not have been expected to be given 
full ministerial positions after Kamotho was defeated in Kangema, 
many people thought the position might go to Mwichigi who had a long 
experience as an assistant minister. However, his past role as a 
Gema enthusiast, together with his previous conviction of an election 
offence, seem not to have endeared him favourably enough, and the 
ministerial position therefore went to Matiba inspite of having ousted 
Kiano who was whispered to have been one of the President's right-
hand men in the country. 
The Spread of the Wind of Change 
Perhaps one of the best examples of the great need for 
change in political leadership in Central Province and in Murang'a 
particularly is Makuyu constituency where the political veterans 
were both removed in 1983'. elections. These were Gachago and 
Wachira who now polled the least votes among the five contestants. 
The victor was Nduati Kariuki who seemed to be capable of saving 
the constituents from the Kiano-based rivalry between Gachago and 
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Wachira, a rivalry that cost the area valuable time, thought and 
energy which could have been directed to the growth of the area's 
social and economic •yellbaiRg. As a constituency covering the larger 
part of whatever land was alienated in Murang'a by the Europeans in 
the colonial period, Makuyu harbours numerous workers and squatters 
in the coffee estates and ranches that still operate there and it is 
therefore one of the constituencies with a massive problem of poverty. 
All the same, the electorate ironically enough elected a member of 
the business class for their MP, thus, once again raising the ques-
tion whether change in the rural areas, including the worker and 
squatter populated rural areas, can be realized without urban-based 
leadership, usually from other classes. 
Finally, Kangema also chose to change its MP in .1983 
in what was again a hotly contested election. The main contestants 
were the incumbent, J.J. Kamotho, and J.N. Michuki both of whom were 
the only candidates in 197 9. This time they were joined by I.N. Kariuki 
who seemed more interested in showing these two main giants that they 
were challengeable thatl in winning the election. The extent to which 
he managed to do this will be dealt with in the next section. So will 
be the other questions concerning the factors that might have led to 
Michuki's victory over Kamotho and the voters' attitude towards the 
entire election subject. 
By 1983, the three key Murang'a constituencies were 
in the hands of the former Gema leadership in the District. These 
were Kandara, Mbiri and Kangema. The other two were also - captured 
by members of the business class which was ideologically not different 
from the former Gema leadership. Murang'a therefore became fully 
"conquered" by the wealthy politically, the politics of old, colonial 
nationalism was brought to an end, and a new class based politics 
seems to have been ushered in. 
Taken at national level, this kind of change will have 
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grave implications on democracy as majority classes strive to restrain 
undemocratic tendencies that are bound to develop in the minority 
classes. This is an issue that should concern all those people interes-
ted in democratic development in Kenya. As we ponder over it, let us 
now turn to seeing electoral performance in Kangema constituency which, 
together with Nakuru Town Constituency will become the basis of our 
generalization to the entire nation. 
Kangema electoral Profile 
The history of electoral process in Kangema Constituency of 
Murang'a District (Central Province, Kenya) can be traced from colonial 
times. In 1958, (Table 23), Dr. J.G. Kiano defeated E.W. Mathu in 
that year's election to fill the Legislative - Council seat for Central 
South Constituency (Fort Hall and Kiambu) under Lyttelton Constitution 
(1954). In 1961 new elections were held to fill the enlarged number 
of African seats in Legislative Council (Legco) and this time Dr. J.G. 
Kiano became the member for Fort Hall after narrowly defeating Kariuki 
Njiri. And in 1963 the independence elections were held with Dr. Kiano 
as the sole candidate for Kangema Constituency, a seat he held for three ••••. 
and half years. 
Meanwhile, in April 1965 when Taddeo Mwaura's two-year term 
in the Senate expired, Mwangi (Thayu) Njage from Kangema, was 
nominated by Murang'a Kanu Branch as the sole candidate for Fort Hall's 
Senate seat. Taddeo Mwaura and four other hopefuls were rejected by 
(7) 
a big majority of District Governing Council delegates, Mwangi 
Njage held his seat upto 1966 when the Senate House was disolved 
through a constitutional repeal. A revision of constituency boundaries 
was also undertaken to accommodate the senators who were to be deployed 
as Members of Parliament in the new One House National Assembly. As 
indicated earlier, Dr. Kiano opted to move out of Kangema, taking 
Kanyenyaini Location (his home location) with him to form a new 
Mbiri Constituency, and thus effectively pushing Jesse Mwangi Gachango 
out of Kiharu Administrative Division (he only retained Gaturi Location) to 
(?) Talfs Leo, 9/4/65 
- 1'+ - IDS/WP/411 
a newly created Makuyu Constituency. Kangema Constituency, now 
made up of four, instead of five administrative locations, was left 
for Mwangi Njage to occupy without any contesting. 
The new MP for Kangema had barely settled to business 
when fresh elections were called in 1969. That year's results indicated 
that in the three year period Mwangi Njage had not gained much popularity 
in Kangema and that although as many as six candidates were involved, 
(the highest number of contestants so far), the turn out of voters was 
only 50.4% lowest in Kangema to date. In fact, even the percentages 
of the winning vote vis a vis the votes cast (33.5%) or vis a vis 
the registered voters (16.9%) have also been the lowest in electoral 
history of Kangema, (Table 23). 
Mwangi Njage had got the Kangema seat so easily that he 
tended not to value it all that much. This was the feeling of many 
voters in Kangema who also pointed out that in spite of the people's 
efforts in constructing various social and economic facilities in a 
bid to uplift their socio-economic standards, Mwangi Njage remained 
virtually aloof. He was so apathetic that he even stayed out of 1974's 
election campaign until only two weeks before the polling day. By then 
he had already done his political career enough damage and the electorate 
had already decided there was a leadership vacuum as far as parliamentary 
representation was concerned. Under these circumstances Mwangi Njage 
could not withstand the challenge from any of the three new contestants 
who included J.J. Kamotho, Ngotho Kariuki and Muturi Kigano. When the 
results were announced, Mwangi Njage held the last position, polling 
only 668 votes out of a total of 18,416 votes cast, and where the 
voter turn out was 71.6%. 
As one might suspect, Kangema was little heard of in the 
district or in the national politics during M. Njage{s period as the 
area's MP. All this time, he had operated in Kiano's armpit and 
never at any one time did he try to sensitize the latter who was said 
to be totally allergic to anyone trying to be independent of him politically. 
At this juncture, it must be observed that Njage was initially 
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brought into politics through the efforts of Kaggiah's followers in 
1965 when the latter was involved in a wrangle with Kiano over the 
Chairmanship of Kanu in Murang'a District. No sooner had he entered 
the National Assembly than Kiano reached for him in a bid to win him 
over to his camp in Murang'a leadership struggle. Njage therefore 
found himself in a dilemma and he seems to have opted for a middle 
way where he neither pleased ncF displeased anyone completely. Thus 
for instance, he adopted a virtually non-participatory stance in the 
KANU - KPU rivalry of 1966-69. Nonetheless such a middle position 
did not pay dividends in 1974 for when Kiano realized that Njage was 
not doing too well, he -v • '•: ;.* v decided to watch Kangema elections 
from the background hoping to lure whoever became the victor soon after 
the elections. 
As it turned out, the 1974 election in Kangema brought in a 
new face in the person of J.J. Kamotho as the area's MP. He had 
polled 43.4% of the votes cast and 31.1% of the registered potential 
votes. For a new person in politics, such a low poll percentage was 
no cause for great satisfaction. It meant that Kamotho had to trend 
the future political ground with caution. What is more, the overstreched 
lull during Njage's period meant that the 1974 elections demanded 
a kind of an upsurge in developmental performance on the part of who-
ever was the winner, 
Kamotho somehow seems to have realized the intricacies of 
this seat and therefore did everything:.- possible to keep out of 
national controversy while at the same time trying to make frequent 
visits to Kangema where he helped to raise funds for various sel-help 
projects that people began. In this process, he established warm rela-
tions with women welfare groups in the area and thus created an 
important resource for his future political moves. He also established 
close ties with various leaders of the coffee cooperative societies, 
with councillors, chiefs and their assistants, most of whom learned to 
regard him more favourably than his predecessor in developmental 
terms. 
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For some reason or other, Kamotho's efforts to lay out 
elaborate logistics for his future political operations did not 
deter other people from developing an apetite for Kangema seat. In 
particular, they did not deter Michuki from laying his counter strategies 
as well. Earlier on, he had not only distinguished himself as a 
leading member of Gema in the district and nationally, but he had also 
successfully sought the association's backing when he was elected 
chairman for Kangema Kanu sub-brach in 1976. Henceforth, it became 
evident that Michuki was the Gema preference for Kangema parliamentary 
seat. His successful efforts to win the Kanu chairmanship in the 
constituency was therefore a kind of a dress-rehearsal for the 
challenge he was preparing to set before Kamotho in the next elections. 
As pointed out earlier, the 1979 elections in Kangema eould 
be said to be the most hotly debated and most fiercely contested ever. 
In fact, the very thought of the intensity of the battle to come kept 
several would be candidates out of the race, some of them turning to 
supporting either Kamotho or Michuki, the only contestants. The most 
important of the. people who shied away in 1979 was Ngotho Kariuki who 
had tried to capture the seat in 1974 but in vain. For reasons best 
known to himself, however, Kariuki suddenly appeared on the public plat-
form in 1979 and gave unreserved support for Kamotho against Michuki. 
He may have been driven by his personal ego to appear to be an important 
political broker in Kangema, but in the eyes of many of his supporters 
his act was politically demeaning. Before the electorate, the act 
completely denuded his credibility and henceforth any moves he made 
were bound to be interpreted in terms of Kamctho-Michuki rivalry. 
Kariuki had therefore sacrificed his identity politically as well. 
One question that keeps nagging the observers of the 1979 
elections in Kangema is whether Kariuki's role was worthwhile at all. 
It may not be easy to estimate the effect he had,against Michuki in 
terms of votes, but if one assumed it to be about half the number that 
made the difference between the two candidates, (i.e. half of 4,474 votes), 
one is tempted to conclude that the effort was far too expensive and 
irrational. It was from this kind of observation that allegations 
- 1'+ - IDS/WP/411 
about monetary deals involving Kamotho and Kariuki became very 
difficult to dismiss. However, in the absence of evidence in support 
of such allegations, they must, for the time being, be dismissed as 
part of the political hog-wash that characterizes most parts of the 
country during an election campaign period. 
The political polarization that characterized Kangema in 1979 
continued virtually intact untill the 1983 elections when the electorate 
had a second chance to decide on the political fate of Kamotho and 
Michuki. Ngotho Kariuki also decided to join the race this time but as 
pointed out above, he had done a lot of damage to his political iden-
tity and credibility in 1979, and could not therefore get very far. 
This left Kamotho and Michuki as the main contenders for the seat. 
Their performance in this election, as well as the voters' interpreta-
tion of the political scene in Kangema at the time becomes the main focus 
of the next part of this paper. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, Kangema voters seem to have formed the habit of 
^turning up in big number during the voting.day. They seem to be 
greatly attracted into voting by the open debate about their socio-
economic expectations and the kind of person that can best help to 
have them realized. Although the candidates' past record greatly 
influences the electorate, the future prospects in relation to a 
candidate's ability to promote economic and social welfare of the 
constituency seem to have played a greater part in determining how 
the voters cast their vote. In most cases, the Kangema voter is 
well informed about the issues and the candidates at hand. Consequently, 
as we see shortly, he has great'confidence in his ability to influence 
change in parliamentary representation in Kangema especially when the 
development of the locality demands it. No wonder that the electorate 
in this constituency has tried to change their MPs at every election 
and this trend will probably continue for some time to come. 
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PART II 
1983 Parliamentary Elections in Kangema Constituency, 
Murang'a District: a survey report 
The Candidates and their initial predicaments 
When President Moi announced in June 1983 that the life of 
Parliament would be cut short by at least one year and that the general 
elections would now be held in 1983 instead of 1984, he caught both 
the electorate and the would-be candidates unawares. The hardest hit, 
in this respect, were the new would-be candidates who had barely laid 
any meaningful grounds in preparation for elections. In particular, 
most of them had not put together the requisite organizational and 
material resources that would enable them to pose's.*?11)8 meaningful 
challenge to the incumbents. 
Although this general panic hit Kangema as much as any other 
constituency in the country, it however had little effect on the two 
main contenders for the seat. For four years since the previous elections 
in 1979 when they were the only contestants, both Kamotho and Michuki 
maintained a very high momentum of competition aimed at preserving 
one's basic support intact and if possible win over• • more voters to 
one's camp before the next elections. It was only Ngotho Kariuki who 
was caught unawares in virtually every respect but more so in terms of 
availability of material and organizational resources, a factor that 
greatly impaired his chances in the 1983 elections. 
Whatever one's predicaments might have been, the candidates 
were differently rated by the electorate depending on their association 
with the constituents, their contribution to development, and their 
general political calibre. The electorate therefore reflected a 
mixed but crucially important attitudinal pattern that in all proba-
bility was in conformity with their voting behaviour. They also had 
interesting attitudes in relation to the electoral process itself 
the ruling party KANU and the government in general. 
-17- IDS/WP/411 
The Lure of'New Ideas" 
One of the important observations of electoral survey in 
1983 was that Kamotho's popularity with the electorate had declined 
substantially since the previous elections in 1979. By September 1983 
about 55% of the electorate were disatisfied with him as their MP 
(Table 24). This category included both men and women of all age 
groups as this Table illustrates. In 1979 Kamotho had scored about 
56.1% of the total votes a cast. For about 45% of the electorate 
to indicate that they were satisfied with him as their MP in 1983 
would mean a drop of about 11% in popularity. This was a large 
difference which would not be easy to bridge within the brief campaign 
period. 
Looking at Kamotho's role as the MP for Kangema, one gets 
the impression that only 39% of the respondents were satisfied with 
him as their MP and at the same time considered him as the person who 
had done most for the development of the constituency, (Table 25). 
About 15.2% of the respondents also considered him to have contributed 
most to the area's development, but for whatever reasons, they were 
disatisfied with him as their MP. About 41.4% of the respondents, on 
the other hand, considered other politicians to have contributed most 
for the area's development. Considering that only a few of them were 
satisfied with the incumbent, one is not surprised that a strong 
challenger could oust Kamotho in 1983. The findings in Table 25 are 
strongly supported by the election results for 1983. In fact, the 
percentage of the respondents disatisfied with the incumbent (52.2%) 
virtually tallies with the winning percentage (52.1%) of the votes 
cast, (Table 23). This is in all probability reflective of a predic-
table behaviour on the part of the electorate given that Table 25 
is statistically significant at J.O. Also, given that the table gives 
a gamma positive relationship of .66, it would appear that the electorate's 
choice of Michuki was heavily influenced by real or potential develop-
mental considerations. 
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In dealing with the question of who has done most for 
the development of the constituency, one cannot help to address 
to the issue of locational bias in respect of the voters' answer to this 
question. Table 26, has tried to illustrate this bias and immediately 
enlightens the observer to the fact that Kamotho had practically no 
following in Iyego location, i.e. Michuki's home location. This Table 
also makes it clear that although he had some difficulties in Kiriti, 
his home location, and in Kiru location, Kamotho was nevertheless the 
highest rated candidate in these two locations in terms of his contribu-
tion to development. Being his home area, one is not surprised that 
Kamotho was well regarded in Kiriti. In the case of Kiru, the main 
explanation for Kamotho's popularity derives from the fact that it was 
here that Kamotho concentrated most of his efforts in terms of harambee 
fund raising activities. This was a vote winning strategy in. a location 
that commanded more than 32% of the total adult population in Kangema. 
In Gitugi Kamotho had about 48% of the voters regarding 
him favourably in development terms, while Michuki and Kariuki had 
26% of the voters each in the same terms. 
It is clear that a candidate's contribution to development 
was one of the most important considerations the voters had in mind 
when they went to cast their votes. This was hence responsible for 
the evident locational bias as regards the three contestants as may 
be suggested in Table 27. This mainly involved the two main contestants, 
Kamotho and Michuki. The latter had the support of virtually 90.% 
of the voters in Iyego while the former commanded about 71% and 
67% of the support in Kiru and Kiriti. In Gitugi Kamotho was 
supported by about 29% of the voters while the remaining 71% was 
shared between Michuki and Kariuki in che ratio of approximately 2:1. 
Various political cultural systems have various factors that 
influence the way the voters cast their votes. In Kenya, the candidate's 
wealth has increasingly been regarded as the most important factor in 
this respect. Education, religion, and traditional leadership have also 
been reported to play a big role in several places. In Kangema, the 
electorate may have been influenced by these factors in the past, but 
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in 1983 elections education and religion had practically no role to 
play in the voting, while a candidate's wealth had only an indirect 
role as we shall see shortly, (see Table 28). 
Of special interest is the manner in which education was 
rendered ineffective as a factor to determine the way people voted. 
Throughout the campaign period, both Kamotho and Kariuki tried to 
make an issue out of education as a strategy of frustrating Michuki 
out of the race: on account of his lack of university education. They 
had observed that in spite of his successful career as a public 
servant and as the Chairman of Kenya Commercial Bank, Michuki's 
lack of university education had always been a sore in his eye. 
This was true in 1979 and 1983 when the other two candidates had a 
minimum of M.A. Degrees behind them. Luckily for him in 1983, 
Michuki managed to obtain the support and full commitment of Dr. Githige 
who was a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Kenyatta University 
College. This was a major breakthrough on the part of Michuki who had 
the confidence that Dr. Githinge's education would effectively counter 
balance Kamotho's and Kariuki's education. Michuki's calculation 
somehow turned out to be right as Dr. Githige's role greatly reduced the 
importance of the candidate's education as a variable or issue in 1983 
elections in this constituency. This was perhaps part of the reason 
why the voters did not regard education as a factor to determine the 
way they would cast their votes. 
The most important factors in the eyes of the electorate were 
traditional leadership and new ideas. From Table 28, one gets the 
impression that about 41.7% of the electorate thought that voting would 
be determined on the basis of traditional leadeship. As this table illus-
trates, a large proportion of the electorate that would be influenced 
by traditional leadership (22.9% of the respondents) was satisfied 
with Kamotho, the sitting MP, and may have: contributed heavily to the 
15,630 votes "that he polled this time. On the other hand, the 18.8% 
of the respondents who were disatisfied with Kamotho may have considered 
Michuki to be a traditional leader by virtue of being the son of a one 
. • - • j; , , . , u • .c • v 8. They may also have time very powerful colonial chief m Kangema J J 
considered his long career as a public1 servant as a qualification for 
(G) In fact the concept traditional leader is illusive because in 
contemporary terms in Kangema (and perhaps the entire Central Province) 
it would simply refer to a person who has occupied the position of 
leadership for some years. In this case both Kamotho and Michuki 
would be called traditional leaders. 
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traditional leadership. Whichever way, both Kamotho and Michuki had 
some past record behind them, a thing that may have qualified them as 
traditional leaders in the eyes of the electorate. No wonder once 
again that the poll difference between the two was not all that great. 
The greatest proportion of the electorate (43.8%) however, 
considered new ideas to be the most important factor determining how 
people were to vote in 1983. As Table 28 shows, the bulk of this 
section of the voters (27% of respondents) were disatisfied with 
Kamotho and were therefore likely to vote en masse in Michuki's 
favour. 
Thus, although Kangema voters were cautious about removing 
a person who had been their MP for nine years, and whom they therefore 
considered to be a traditional leader, they nevertheless sought for a 
person who could inject some fresh ideas on how to overcome their 
social and economic problems. 
Michuki seemed to represent such an image which was highly 
rated by a large proportion of the electorate irrespective of their 
age and level of education. However, it is worthy noting that the 
electorate with more than eight years of education seemed to be more 
disatisfied with Kamotho as the incumbent than were the less educated. 
This section of the electorate represented a high proportion (about 52%) 
of the entire electorate and its impact on the election results cannot 
be taken .lightly. In addition, a good part of the voters who were 
out for new ideas was made of relatively young peole who were hardly 
directly affected by Michuki's anti-Mau Mau role in the colonial 
period more than twenty five years ago. 
In this regard, neither Kamot-ho's nor Kariuki's efforts to 
resurrect Michuki's image as a ruthless mutilator of people struggling 
for freedom could find fertile ground in a good section of the 
electorate. Given that this was the main thrust of their attack on 
Michuki, one is not surprised that the latter was able to counter it 
as a matter of the past, insisting that his sole objective was to 
look into the future and help promote the area's development at the 
fastest rate possible. In particular .he promised the electorate 
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that he would help devise new ways of income earning in 
the constituency; he would seek ways and means of alleviating un-
employment among the youth; and he would further promote farming and 
9 
business interests for Kangema people. 
Class interests and elections 
It would perharps be right to argue that Michuki's greatest 
assets were his wealth and his successful career as a public servant and 
as a banker. He may have legally used his position as the Chairman of 
Kenya Commercial Bank to provide some Kangema people with loans to 
improve their economic position especially in business. In fact judicious 
application of his power as the chief executive of the bank seems to 
have led to his election as the Chairman of Kanu Kangema constituency 
in 1976, when he was also a•leading member of GEMA national executive. 
For the purposes of 198 3 elections, however, Michuki's wealth.:was most 
useful in that it enabled him to maintain a full level of liquidity 
throughout the electioneering period.^ 
Thus, although wealth was not rated highly as a factor 
determining how people would vote in 1983, it nevertheless became a 
basis of expecting better performance from Michuki in terms of new 
ideas to improve the people's life conditions. In particular, 
Michuki's position as a successful careerist and businessman seems 
to have endeared him to the urban elites who hailed from Kangema. 
A number of them had supported Ngotho Kariuki in 1974, and then 
supported Kamotho 
in 1979. But by 1983 they had become .disillusioned 
and turned to backing Michuki on whom they now placed their hopes for 
individual advancement in one's endeavours. They were mainly the 
educated elite, the urban workers and petty- bourgeoisie, and the 
upcoming young urban business elites. Their numbers were not big, but 
added to those who had supported Michuki in 1979, they were able to 
influence many voters who were close to them in class terms into seeing 
Kamotho with disaffection. As Table 29 illustrates, therefore, a 
good section of rural shop/hotel keepers and other businessmen were 
disatisfied with Kamotho. Disatisfaction was greatest among the teachersf 
the students and the unemployed (Table 29 and 30,) all of whom were 
likely to be persuaded into viewing Michuki's wealth as a product of 
(9) Interview with J.I. Michuki, and Michuki's campaign meetings 
address records, September 1983, 
(10) Conservative estimates indicate that more than Shs. 5 million 
may have been spent by Michuki between the day the President announced 
that the elections would be held in 1983 and the day the election 
results were announced on September 27, 1983. (Estimates based on 
interviews and discussions with leading campaigners for all the candidates) 
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his entrepreneurial ideas sane of which they could tap for their 
own benefit. In this respect, Michuki's wealth and class position as 
a member of the 'hational bourgeoisie" attracted a good section of 
those aspiring to join that class some day. Otherwise, in class terms 
he was nowhere close to the majority class of the peasantry in Kangema. 
All the same, while trying to woo the peasantry to vote for him he at the 
same time did all he could to avoid further alienation of this important 
class in terms of the votes it commanded. 
The above, however, should not be construed to mean that 
Michuki had the full backing of the business/trade group in the 
constituency. In fact it happened that Kamotho had the confidence 
of the greater part of rural shop/hotel keepers, general businessmen 
and salesmen, who were also more likely to be older and therefore 
knowledgeable about Michuki's anti-people record in the colonial days. 
About 57% of them therefore indicated their satisfaction with Kamotho 
as the area's MP., as opposed to the 43% who replied they were dis-
atisfied with him. Nevertheless, the entire business group irres-
pecitve of the side they supported, tended to be more elitist than 
not. 
The dominant elite interests just described swept through 
the entire Constituency and no wonder that the entire electoral debate 
tended to be mainly elitist. It addressed itself mainly to elite 
issues like the supply of electricity, telephone, tarmac roads and to 
the need to introduce new business opportunities. Some national 
issues which little concerned the local peasantry were also brought 
forward. These included the traitor issue, Kamotho's quarrel with the 
University, and the like. But hardly did any candidate associate 
himself with the peasantry as such. None of thern was, for example, 
closely associated with peasant cooperatives (coffee, tea, dairy). 
As pointed out above, Kamotho had established a close association with 
various welfare groups which tended to be elitist, especially in leader-
ship, and which therefore could not prevent a decline in the support 
that he had earlier enjoyed among the peasantry. At any rate, the 
leaders of several welfare groups together with Kamotho himself, were 
accused of having political association with the leadership which had 
been implicated in the misappropriation of peasant earnings especially 
in coffee and dairy marketing cooperatives. They were also accused of 
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associating with leaders who were implicated in the loss of harambee 
collections for various self-help projects. And they were accused of 
collaboration with people who frustrated the peasant efforts in search 
for improved life conditions.through self-help projects such as schools, 
cattle dips, and housing and water .programmes.. As such, the peasant 
support for Kamotho, as may be seen in Table 30, had become as low, as 
45% (i.e. 9 out of 20 respondents), while 55% of them were disatisfied 
with his record. . .• 
In class terms both Kamotho and Kariuki had , a peasantry 
background. But they were not peasants themselves. Since his first 
bid for Kangema-seat in 197 4,- Kariuki has not maintained a very close 
association with Kangema peasantry. His reappearance in 1979, when he 
supported Kamotho against Michuki, did not place him any closer to the 
peasant electorate. If anything, it served to alienate him all the 
more as his political identity as well as his own sense of direction 
became increasingly misty. Hence his return as a candidate in 1983 did 
not get Kariuki very far; ho obtained only 477 votes out of a total, 
of 34,529 votes cast. Ho was not only politically far from the voters, 
but was also organizationally in a mess. He did not therefore attract 
and retain the full support of his sympathizers who, when it became 
clear he was losing, tended,to keep-off as a way of shunning the 
eventual defeat by association* 
Kamotho, on the other hand, was perharps the most advantaged 
candidate right from June 1933. His main point of strength lay in the 
fact that he was already a cabinet minister since the 1979 elections, 
and was most likely to be favoured by several government officials 
particularly the provincial administration and the police. This 
strength, however, became the greatest source of his trouble in his bid 
to retain the Kangema" seat. Right from 1980 Kamotho began to over-
play his position both as a member of the executive and as a member of 
the petty-bourgeoisie struggling to enter the comprador or national 
bourgeois class at everyone else's expense. In both cases, he did not 
feel constrained as he levelled attacks and threats against the students, 
teachers, and other members of the petty-bourgeoisie. Sometimes he 
simply brushed them aside as people who never mattered at all politically. 
- 1'+ - IDS/WP/411 
To make the matters all the more serious, Kamotho was alleged to have 
castigated sane Kangema voters who insisted that he was first and fore-
most answerable to them as his constituents, and irrespective of 
whether he was a minister or not. And during the election campaign 
period, he was said to have been behind the transfer of a Kangema Dis-
trict'" Of ficer who seemed to have sensed a wind of political change 
against Kamotho and who therefore tried to be neutral even to the 
minister, himself. Several other allegations of threats against chiefs, 
sub-chiefs, school heads and other government officers were encountered. 
They all pointed towards an individual who was out to use his position 
of power to retain the seat whatever the cost. 
Most of Kamotho's efforts to retain Kangema seat tended to 
backfire and to alienate the voters all the more. No wonder he lost 
some 2,165 votes in 1983 when he polled 15,630 votes as compared to 
the 17,795 votes he had polled in 1979. About 477 of the alienated 
voters seem to have cast their votes for Kariuki, while about 1,698 
seem to have drifted to Michuki's camp and thus requiring him to rec-
ruit nearly 3,000 floating voters to secure victory. At this point, 
Kamotho's sin was that of negligent arrogance. A sin that not only cost 
him the seat that year, but one that may be difficult to clear before the 
'•" • next elections . 
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The electorate, .KANU and the Government 
Turning to the issue of voters' attitude towards the 
party and the government, one notices the presence of negative but very 
small relationship between voters' satisfaction with Kanu and their 
satisfaction with the setting MP., (Table 31). That means there was 
significant tendency for those satisfied with the sitting MP (90%) 
to be only satisfied, but not very satisfied with Kanu, while many 
of those disatisfied with him (40%) tended to be very satisfied with 
the party and 50% of them were only satisfied with the party. However, 
one also notes that of those disatisfied with the sitting MP. about 10% 
were also disatisfied with the party, while no one among these satis-
fied with- the incumbent was disatisfied with Kanu. The corollary 
of this is that those who were very satisfied with Kanu also tended 
to be disatisfied with the sitting MP. 
A similar pattern.emerges as one tries to see whether there 
could be any association between voters' satisfaction with Kanu and 
their.view of the person who hay contributed most for the area's 
development. Thus, most of those who thought that the sitting MP had 
done most for tharea's development (75%) tended to be only satis-
fied with Kanu, while many of those who named some other politicians 
tended to be very satisfied with the party (40%). Seme 50% of the 
latter were only satisfied with the party (Table 32). Again,this is 
the group that contains an element that is disatisfied with the party 
(54) or one that simply doesn't know whether tlleyare satisfied with 
it or not (5%). 
All thin may be explained by the fact that Michuki and 
Kariuki, the two candidates opposing Karr rtho, were respectively Chair-
man and Secretary for Kangema constituency Kanu sub-branch. In addition, 
Gichphi Githuna, who was (and still is) the Murang'a District Kanu 
Branch Chairman, and who has always been opposed to Kamotho for being 
Kiano's proxy in Kangema, was one of the main supporters and campaign 
organizers for. Michuki. Given this situation, it was likely that the 
voters behind Michuki felt more satisfied with Kanu than those who 
were behind Kamotho. In this case one would suspect, that the voters 
tended to mix up the particular individuals and the positions they 
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occupied. Where the voters were satisfied with the particular 
individual they were also more satisfied with .his position, in Kanu 
for example, than those who were disatisfied with him. If this inter-
pretation is correct, it would then appear that the personality rather 
than his role in the party, or the party's performance for that matter, 
was more instrumental in influencing the voters. In particular, Gichohi 
Githuna's oratory and ability to articulate issues as well as answer 
attacks constituted an invaluable asset for Michuki than his position 
as Kanu District Chairman. In this respect, the nentrality that the 
party sought to achieve in the electoral struggle was fully upheld in 
Kangema. 
On the other hand, however, the fact that a huge section of 
the voters gave the cautious answer of "satisfied" rather than "very 
satisfied" with Kanu (Tables 31 and 32) might suggest; a deliberate effort 
on their part to sound seme reservation in respect of the party's per-
formance. It rhould be noted that a'don't-know" response was very small 
(Table 32) in this respect, thus suggesting a high level of awareness as 
well. The wary stance of the voters is maintained when asked to indicate 
their agreement or disagreement with the view that Kanu and the Govern-
ment had done a lot for the country, (Table 33) . The majority of the 
voters of all ages would only agree, but not strongly agree, with the 
assertion. It is notable that female voters were more cautious than 
their male counterparts who gave a greater "strongly agree" response. 
In all, once again, no one gives a "don't know" response.. 
As such, Kangema voters seem to consider the party and the 
government as one and the same thing and hence the similarity of .their 
responses to the two questions. Their cautious responses, however, 
must be treated seriously particularly in view of the high voter turn 
out experienced in Kangema since 197 4. They seem to be cautioning 
both the party and the government that they should not be taken for 
granted and that they expect better performance frcm both the party and 
the government in respect of the way they listen and attend to people's 
social and economic needs and demands in a bid to improve their life 
conditions. 
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.Voting and Influencing the Govern,nent 
The above; conclusion is collaborated by the voters' attitude to-
wards voting and the role of elections. In the first place, about 62% 
of Kangema voters believe voting in general elections has been secret 
(Table 34) and they therefore seem to derive a lot of confidence in the 
outccme of their act of voting. So far there has not been much talk of 
fraud in Kangema elections and one is persuaded to consider this factor 
as contributing to the tradition of high voter turn out that characterize. 
the constitutency. Even ,en, one still observes SCme skepticism among 
the male voters below 40 years of age where the rate of non-voting seems 
to have been high too. It is from this section of the electorate that 
the bulk of the youth wingers is derived and may be they have better 
information and hence reasons to believe that voting is not secret. All 
the same their belief has net adversely affected the general voter turn 
out in a bid by the electorate to express their view about who should 
represent them in parliament. 
In the second place, there seems to be seme reservations in 
the minds of the voters in rcspcct of the effc.c . vy of voting in 
influencing the. government. Abc,.t 56% of the electorate believe that 
voting influences the government while about 44% believe it does not. 
(Table 35). This rather cautious way of seeing things seems to be close 
to the one we saw earlier on regarding the voters satisfaction with Kanu 
and performance of Kanu and government in the country. It covers all 
age groups, both men and women. The only deviation, however, is among the 
voters below 40 years who seem to be highly convinced in the efficacy 
of voting as a means of influencing the government. In this case, what 
they seem to be Cxvy:'r.g.-' is that if voting is secret and fair the result is 
likely to influence the govenment and therefore, perhaps, people should do 
all they can to cast their votes. Thus although this section of the 
electorate might initially be regarded as being uninterested in voting, 
in fact they take a lot of interest as there is much at stake in terms 
of the policies that are likely to emerge as a result of the choice 
they make. 
Mar:;, voters above the age of 40, on the other hand, believe 
voting d2&;.f not influence the government and in this case the only 
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reason for voting would seem to ba the need to influence the composi-
tion of local leadership, parliamentary and civic, in the hope that 
more attention will be given to their needs and demands locally* 
Finally, the Kangema electorate overwhelmingly support the 
idea of choosing a new MP at every election, (Table 36). This trend is, 
once again, characteristic of voters in all age groups, both men and 
women. It is a characteristic that summarizes their behaviour since 
1969 during which time whoever won the parliamentary seat in Kangema 
did so with a margin that was- nearly counterbalanced by his nearest 
rival,.(see Table 23). It is a phenomenon which also summarizes the 
voters' assetive attitude as concerns their right to change their MPs. 
They strongly uphold the view that the 'heat" belongs to them. That 
they only choose who occupies it for the time being; but nobody should 
claim it perpetually. This attitude could also be responsible for the 
high voter turn out since 1969. It is likely to continue in the 
future thus making it unlikely that one will become an MP for Kangema 
for more than two terms consecutively. It is also an attitude that 
is in keeping with the voters' preference for new ideas as a factor 
to determine the way people vote, a preference which is in turn based 
on the belief that there is always a better and more capable person 
around and he should be given a chance to demonstrate his ability in 
leading the people to faster social and economic development. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, one notes that the attitude and behaviour of 
the electorate in an election are determined by a multiplicity of 
factors revolving around the way the voters perceive the incumbent as 
compared to his challengers as relates to the way the expectations of 
the constituents have been met or are likely to be met in the near future. 
In 1983 the role of the urban elite who operated against Kamotho, to-
gether with Kamotho's alienation of a good number of the peasantry, the 
unemployed and the educated elite, all seem to have greatly contributed 
to Michuki's victory. This, however, was a very narrow victory and 
Michuki will have to be positively active if at all he expects to be re-
elected in the next elections. Although buying up the voters may not 
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have been very crucial in determining the results, a candidate's ability 
to keep financially afloat during the entire campaign period has 
become very important in Central Province. This factor, more than 
anything else, has made it very difficult for several would-be good 
leaders to seek the parli- .ntary seats in the Province, and in 
Murang'a in particular. In this area, campaigning has become a form of 
emp103mlent, and for a candidate to succeed he has now to employ a huge 
team of campaigners who are graded according to what they are able to 
offer, and of course paid accordingly. Thus, although the voters would 
not be voting somebody because he is wealthy, no doubt his wealth greatly 
raises his probability of being elected. Without this factor, one 
wonders whether all the current MPs from Murang'a would have been 
voted in. 
Under the circumstances, even though various issues may 
be articulated in the election campaign, the wealthy personality has 
in the final analysis indirectly forced itself on the electorate. 
It is indirectly brandished as a symbol of an individual's ability-... in 
terms of promoting the econom.jp and social progress of the locality. 
This is a departure from the days of political personality when Kiano 
tried to dominate everybody else purely on the basis of political 
manipulation. It i-s-not clear, however, whether the 'emergence of the 
wealthy personality in the political arena is likely to develop into 
a new level of ideological debate in the near, futureHowever, the 
Matiba- Kamau Mweru struggle in the 1983 elections in Mbiri seems to 
point at this kind of development. In other words,-it is unlikely that 
the wealthy personality will become benevolent in terms of using wealth 
to promote the area's economic and social progress. Poverty will 
therefore continue to rise .and the surfacing of the ideological 
question becomes inevitable. 
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Historical Electoral Chart for Kangema Constituency^ Murang'a 
District 1958 - 1983. ' 
Year Distribution of Votes and other 
Particulars 
Voters 
Turn Out 
Winning (W) 
or Candi-
dates (C) 
Vote as 
Percentage 
of Reg. 
Voters 
Winning(W) 
or Candi-
dates (C) 
Vote as 
Percentage 
of Votes 
Cast 
1958 Central South -Constituency = 
Fort Hall & Kiambu 
J.G. Kiano 6,684 
E.W. Mathu 3,936 
10,620 
- ' 
1961 (Fort Hall Constituency) 
J.G. Kiano 47,885 
K. Njiri 45,719 
D. Mbarathi 1,483 
95,087 
1963 (Kangema Constituency) 
J.G. Kiano (Unopposed) 
1965 
1966 
Mwangi Njage sole candidate for 
Senate by-election for Murang'a 
District (oust T. Mwaura) 
1 
Senate disolved and its members 
deployed te new and adjusted 
constituencies: 
; Mwangi Njage became new MP for 
Kangema 
1969 
T< 
R( 
j 
Mwangi Njage 4,552 
0. Githiomi 3,608 
D. Gachucha 2,878 
M. Kimarua 1,03 9 
G. Gichuhi 886 
J.K. Makumi 658 
Dtal Votes Cast 13,621 
^istered Voters 27,042 
50.4% 
(C)16.9% 
(W )16.9% 
, , J 
(C )33.5% 
(W)33.5% 
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Table 24: Voterfe' Age, Sex, and Satisfaction with Sitting MP 
(n=49) 
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Table 26: Voters-' location, and View. about who has done most 
for- area's development 
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Table 28: Distribution of Voters according to their Satisfaction 
with sitting 'MP and their feelings about the" most 
important factor to determine Voting, 


Table 34: Voters' attitude towards secrecy of voting 
